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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Eric Harold Ewell appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that the district court erred by dismissing 
one of his claims because the court misperceived that claim and wrongfully concluded 
that it could have been raised on appeal and that it was not meritorious. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Ewell's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err by dismissing one of Mr. Ewell's claims because it misperceived 
the nature of that claim? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Dismissing One Of Mr. Ewell's Claims Because It 
Misperceived The Nature Of That Claim 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Ewell asserts that, because the district court misperceived the nature of his 
claim regarding ineffectiveness of his appellate attorney, the district court improperly 
granted summary dismissal as to this claim. 
B. The District Court Erred By Dismissing One Of Mr. Ewell's Claims Because It 
Misperceived The Nature Of That Claim 
The State has raised three defenses to Mr. Ewell's claim on appeal: 1) that the 
claim was not properly raised in the petition for post-conviction relief; 2) the claim may 
not be raised for the first time on appeal; and 3) any error is harmless. Mr. Ewell will 
address all of the State's assertions. 
1. The Claim Was Properly Before The Court 
The State asserts that, because the facts in support of the claim are raised only 
in Mr. Ewell's affidavit, rather than in the petition, the claim was not properly before the 
district court. (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) The State is incorrect. In his petition, 
Mr. Ewell asserted that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. (R., p.4.) He further 
alleged that "counsel admitted shortcomings." (R., p.4.) A claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is a claim of a Sixth Amendment violation. See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Therefore, Mr. Ewell, in his petition, asserted a Sixth 
Amendment claim and then properly used his affidavit to support that claim with facts. 
3 
Moreover, the district court was clearly aware that Mr. Ewell was supplementing 
his petition with facts in his affidavit, as it considered the claim that Stuart v. State, 145 
Idaho 467 (Ct. App. 2007), should have been overruled, which is not asserted in 
Mr. Ewell's petition, but only in his affidavit. (See, e.g., R., p.133; cf R., pp.3-7.) The 
State also acknowledges as much in its brief, where it states that the district court 
treated allegations raised in the affidavit as claims of a double jeopardy violation. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.7 n.1.) The district court considered the assertions raised in the 
petition as alleging claims. Mr. Ewell properly used his affidavit to supplement his 
petition with assertions of fact. The claim at issue on appeal was properly before the 
district court. 
2. The Issue May Be Raised For The First Time On Appeal 
The State asserts that the court specifically addressed the factual allegations 
underpinning the ineffective assistance of counsel claims it deemed raised in Ewell's 
petition - i.e., that counsel was ineffective in relation to the presentence investigation 
and evaluation processes. (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) The State acknowledges that 
the district court "did not address the factual allegation in Ewell's affidavit that trial 
counsel failed to 'preserve the primary issues for appeal when [he] did not renew the 
motion to dismiss after the state amended the information (concerning the Prior Misd. 
Charge) {R., p.74)." (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) Despite acknowledging that the district 
court did not address the factual allegation in the affidavit that is at issue on appeal, the 
State asserts that "Ewell cannot complain for the first time on appeal that the court 
misperceived the allegations of his petition." (Respondent's Brief, p.15.) The State's 
argument is without merit. 
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First, the State acknowledges that a petitioner need not respond to the district 
court's notice of intent to dismiss in order to preserve a claim that the petition was 
improperly dismissed. (Respondent's Brief, p.15. (citing Gatza v. State, 139 Idaho 533 
(2003)). Nevertheless, the State asserts that, pursuant to DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 
599, 601-02 (2009), "where, as here, a represented petitioner receives notice of the 
bases for dismissal and fails to respond, he cannot later claim on appeal that petition 
was dismissed without adequate notice." (Respondent's Brief, p.15.) 
However, as DeRushe is limited to circumstances in which the State files a 
motion for dismissal as opposed to where, as here, the court filed a notice of intent to 
dismiss, the State's argument lacks merit. In Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517 (2010), the 
Supreme Court noted that, "DeRushe clearly holds than appellant may not challenge 
the sufficiency of the notice contained the state's motion for summary disposition, 
and accompanying memoranda, for the first time on appeal." Id. at 521-22 (emphasis 
added). The DeRushe court left the Gatza rule intact. DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 602. 
Because this case deals with the contents of a court's notice of intent to dismiss, the 
rule in Gatza applies and the claim may be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Further, the notice was insufficient. In the order dismissing the petition, the 
district court set forth what it believed the claim to be and then asserts, "[Mr. Ewell] did 
not support any of these statements with any other affidavits or evidence." (R., p.121 
(emphasis added).) While the court generally stated that Mr. Ewell's claims were not 
supported by evidence, it was concluded that the specific claims it was addressing were 
not supported by the evidence. The State acknowledges that the district court "did not 



















primary issues for appeal when [he] did not renew the motion to dismiss after the state 
amended the information (concerning the Prior Misd. Charge) (R., p.74)." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.14.) The court therefore failed to give proper (or any) notice of 
intent to dismiss the claim at issue on appeal. 
3. The Error Is Not Harmless 
Finally, the State asserts that any error by the district court was harmless. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.17.) The State is incorrect. If the district court orders dismissal 
sua sponte, it must first give the petitioner twenty days' notice and allow tl1e petitioner to 
respond to the notice. I.C. § 19-4906(b). The purpose of this requirement is to give the 
petitioner an opportunity to challenge the decision before it is finalized. Baruth v. 
Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159-60 (Ct. App. 1986). Thus, this requirement is strict; it 
makes no difference whether the petitioner's claims appear to be meritorious or not. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has noted the following: 
Under these circumstances the district court cannot be faulted for 
determining that appellant's application for post-conviction relief is 
meritless and dismissing the action. However, we do find error in the 
court's failure to follow the provisions of I.C. § 19-2906(b). The district 
court failed to notify appellant of its intention to dismiss the application and 
thus offer appellant an opportunity to reply within twenty days. This error 
requires that the judgment denying appellant's application for post-
conviction relief be reversed. 
Cherniwchan v. State, 99 Idaho 128, 129-30 (1978) (emphasis added). Thus, even in 
cases where it appears that the petition is "meritless," error in providing notice requires 
reversal. 
The State cites Gomez v. State, 120 Idaho 632 (Ct. App. 1991) for the 
proposition that harmless error applies in post-conviction cases. (Respondent's Brief, 
6 
p.18.) In Gomez, the Court of Appeals held that, although the district court erred in 
failing to follow the twenty-day notice requirement, the error was harmless because 
there was nothing in the record from which the petitioner could have established the 
timeliness of his petition. Id. at 634. To the extent that this case is inconsistent with 
Cherniwchan, it is not good law in this State as it is in conflict with Idaho Supreme Court 
precedent. 1 The rule in Idaho is that even if the factual assertions in the application are 
insufficient to make a prima facie showing of a right to relief, during the twenty-day 
period for response to the dismissal motion the applicant is entitled to present 
supplemental evidence to support the claims. See, e.g, Saykhamchone v. State, 127 
Idaho 319 (1995). 
On the merits of Mr. Ewell's claim, the State has adopted the district court's ruling 
the underlying criminal case regarding Count VII with regard to luring and luring with a 
sexual motivation. (Respondent's Brief, p.20.) As Mr. Ewell has already briefed the 
challenge to Count VII with regard to luring with a sexual motivation in docket number 
35093, Mr. Ewell adopts the argument made in the Appellant's Brief in #35093 and 
incorporates that argument herein by reference that luring and luring with a sexual 
motivation are not substantially similar to an Idaho offense. Regarding the prior 
conviction of communication with a minor for an immoral purpose, the Supreme Court of 
Washington has interpreted RCW 9.68A.090 to prohibit "communication with children 
for the predatory purpose of promoting their exposure to and involvement in sexual 
misconduct." State v. McNal/ie, 846 P.2d 1358, 1363-64 (Wash. 1993). The State has 
1 In this context, the Gomez Court also stated the timeliness of a post-conviction petition 
was a jurisdictional issue. Gomez, 120 Idaho at 634. This was specifically disavowed 




















asserted that such a crime is substantially similar to attempted lewd conduct, attempted 
sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age, and attempted 
enticing of children over the internet. (Respondent's Brief, p.21.) The State's argument 
fails. Regarding lewd conduct, I.C. § 18-1508 sets forth specific acts that constitute 
lewd conduct, such as manual-genital, oral-genital, and genital-genital contact. 
I.C. § 18-1508. Washington's law requires only a showing of "sexual misconduct," 
which could be acts other than those required for a conviction of lewd conduct. 
Attempted sexual battery requires findings not required by Washington's law, namely 
that the crime be convicted by a person who is at least five years older than a minor 
child who is sixteen or seventeen years of age. I. C. § 18-1509A. Finally, enticing 
children over the internet requires the crime be committed by a person over the age of 
18 against a child under the age of 16, and, obviously, that the perpetrator utilize the 
internet. I.C. § 18-1509A. Washington's law applies to "any person" who 
communicates with "a minor." RCW 9.68A.090. In sum, there are several important 
distinctions between Idaho and Washington law regarding this subject. These 
dtfferences are sufficient at least, that it was error for the district court not to consider 
the claim and give notice to Mr. Ewell of its intent to dismiss this claim. Remand is 
appropriate to fully litigate the issue in the district court. 
It was Mr. Ewell's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss 
after the information was amended. The district court was required to provide Mr. Ewell 
with notice of why it believed any motion to dismiss would have failed and provide him 
with an opportunity to rebut the allegations. Because he was never afforded this 
8 
opportunity, the error was not harmless and Mr. Ewell's case must be remanded to 
litigate this claim in district court. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ewell requests that the district court's order summarily dismissing his petition 
be reversed and that his case be remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 13th day of February, 2012. 
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